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This thesis examines the process by which decisions
are made in the People’s Republic of China during times of
crisis.  It explores who has the authority to make
decisions in China today and who will have this authority
as new leaders take control of the Politburo in 2002.  The
thesis also examines the role that the People’s Liberation
Army plays in national security and foreign policy
decision-making during times of crisis.  
The April 2001 EP-3 incident is examined to assess
high-level decision-making in the Communist Party, the
level of military involvement, and the role of the media. 
This thesis concludes that decisions are made on a
consensual basis by a nuclear circle of leaders consisting
mainly of Politburo Standing Committee members and a few
close advisors to the President.  The thesis also concludes
that the military plays a smaller role than is often
presumed in the decision-making process during times of
crisis.  
Decision-making in the PRC may be expected to become
more decentralized in the future.   Although no theoretical
or legal framework exists to guide the current process, it
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The purpose of this thesis is to assess the PRC
decision-making process during the April 2001 EP-3 incident
on Hainan Island in order to provide a basis for better
predicting Chinese reactions to crises in the future. 
Currently, it is unclear how the PRC makes important
national security decisions, particularly in times of
crisis.   When a U.S. Navy EP-3 collided with a Chinese
interceptor and conducted an emergency landing on Hainan on
April 1st, U.S. officials were shocked to learn that the
crew was going to be detained for an unknown period of
time.  Eleven days later, upon release of the crew and
after many high-level diplomatic discussions, it was still
not clear who actually had the decision-making power in
China and how much the PLA had influenced the decision to
hold the EP-3 crew.  
Following this introduction, chapter II of this thesis 
provides a summary of PRC leadership trends dating back to
Mao Zedong and concludes with an assessment of Jiang
Zemin’s personal political style.   It is clear today that,
unlike Mao’s day, no one individual or even a single body
within the PRC has sole authority to make decisions on
behalf of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC).  Chapter II
highlights the role of personality in policy decisions. 
Jiang Zemin’s leadership style in China differs from that
of Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping.  When Mao was chairman, 
people resolutely supported whatever instructions he gave. 
There could be no questions or consultations about Mao’s
decisions.  When Deng Xiaoping ruled China, he could not
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completely fill Mao’s shoes.  But he did hold a great
amount of power in China.  He personally took on the role
of reforming Chinese economic and political systmes which
eventually created tensions that led to the Tiananmen
Square demonstrations in 1989.   Finally it was realized
that corruption within the government needed to come to an
end and new leadership was ready to take over.   From 1989
on, Jiang Zemin has led the nation as general secretary of
the Chinese Communist Party (CPC).  Jiang lacks the
absolute authority that Mao and Deng held, although for
China, this has proved to be an advantage.  Jiang has
transitioned policy-making from a personal to a collective
decision-making process.  Jiang has not put an ideological
stamp on politics like his predecessors.  Instead, he has
taken a middle course that encompasses a wide spectrum of
opinions from conservatives to liberals.  It is Jiang’s
personal political style that contributed to the final
outcome of the EP-3 incident.  
Next, Chapter III explains the structure of the PRC
government, including the differences between the Communist
Party structure and the state structure.  Chapter III also
examines the role of the Chinese staff system and the
foreign affairs structure.  Additionally it covers the role
of the military assessing exactly how much influence the
military has over foreign policy in China.  Finally,
Chapter III provides an in-depth summary of who exactly are
the key players and main decision-makers in China.  
The CPC Political Bureau (Politburo) is the seat of
central leadership and is responsible for day-to-day
political affairs when the Central Committee is not in
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session.  The Politburo’s Standing Committee (PBSC) is
presently made up of seven people who meet once a week, and
it is these seven individuals who are the true decision-
making core in China.  These are not the only people that
influence the decision-making process however.  Depending
on the decision at hand, a select few of high-ranking
military officers and officials in other policy sectors may
also be part of a working group to make decisions in times
of crisis.  
The military itself normally plays a very small role
when it comes to making decisions of great significance. 
The interests of the military and of the party have parted
ways over the years, and the main concern for military
leaders is to make sure they receive proper funding.  So
important is this issue that they may be willing to create
a crisis in order to receive needed attention.  Meanwhile,
the party is focused more on national security and economic
growth, and thus, has a greater desire to negotiate in
crisis situations.   
The foreign affairs structure is extremely important
in China, more so than is usually mentioned in most books
about China.  The frequently encountered impression is that
the military runs China, or at least holds great influence. 
In actuality, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) holds
greater influence since members conduct diplomatic affairs
on behalf of the state.  The MFA played a significant role
during the EP-3 incident, not as a direct decision-making
body, but as a communication pathway between U.S. diplomats
and PRC leaders.   Part of the effort to understand the
decision-making process in China includes trying to
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understand communications and who speaks to whom behind the
scenes.  In this regard, the MFA plays a significant role,
and it did so during the EP-3 incident, since MFA officials
were the only points of contact for U.S. diplomats in
China.
Chapter IV offers an in-depth examination of the EP-3
incident as a case study to answer the questions raised in
the introduction.  By examining the negotiation process
during the EP-3 incident, we can begin to “peel the onion”
of decision-making authority in China.  Additionally, the
EP-3 incident demonstrates the process by which decisions
are made and how information is passed up and down the
echelons of party, military, and government.  By exploring
a crisis like the EP-3 incident, it becomes apparent that
the PLA actually plays a small, but not insignificant role
in executive decision-making.  PLA officers were the first
to respond to the collision on 01 April 2001, and so their
involvement was essentially inevitable.  The PLA would have
probably preferred to handle the situation according to its
own liking, but civilian officials took over and conducted
the negotiations.  It is likely, however, that civilian
officials also negotiated with PLA officers in order to
maintain a balance and keep the PLA from making the
situation worse.  
Chapter IV attempts to grasp the importance of the
media in China and how the Communist party controls the
media during times of crisis in order to create or avoid
certain responses from the Chinese public.  During the EP-3
incident, regime media did not tell the entire story, and
even Internet chat rooms were monitored and sometimes shut
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down.  Public opinion affects decision-making in China as
it does in the United States.  The difference however, is
that public opinion is really party opinion, because of the
limited amount of information provided to the average
citizen.  In the case of the EP-3 incident, world media
worked in favor of the American crew, because whatever
decision PRC officials made would unfold under the eye of 
world media.  The entire world watched this event unfold,
and such pressure surely affected the Chinese leaders’
decision-making process.
After examining the past record of decision-making,
the current structure and style of leadership, and the
events of a recent crisis, Chapter V explores the up and
coming leadership that will take the reigns of authority in
2002.  Among those expected to retire in September 2002 are
Jiang Zemin and Li Peng, as well as top ranking military
leaders such as Zhang Wannian and Chi Haotian.  Also,
anywhere between 75 and 120 of the 188 members of the
Central Committee could retire in 2002.  Hu Jintao is
slated to become China’s next president, the Communist
Party’s next General Secretary, and the Central Military
Commission’s (CMC) next chairman.  Hu, like many fourth
generation leaders, is considered a moderate to liberal
reformer.  These new politicians have different visions for
China than their predecessors, and thus will make different
decisions and will initiate a different decision-making
process.  They are expected to be more accessible and more
open about their views and policies.  Chapter V explains
the changes that China will experience in the coming year
and how such changes in personnel will affect the
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institutions and mechanisms that have long dominated
China’s foreign policy making.
Chapter VI concludes with an overall analysis of the
decision-making process in China and what we can expect
from China’s leaders in the future.  Many Americans have a
tendency to “mirror image” other nations and therefore
expect other governments to act as our own would act.  They
become disappointed or disgruntled when the results are not
what they expected.  The fact of the matter is, not all
national governments act as the U.S. Government does, and
certainly China falls into this category.  What should be
gained from this thesis is that China does not have a
crisis management mechanism in order to respond quickly
when crises arise.  Nor does China have a National Security
Council to advise the President in decision-making or a CIA
to provide accurate and timely intelligence during times of
crisis.  What China does have is a group of new leaders who
seek to reform China politically, economically, and
militarily.  
There exists no Western theoretical framework that can
capture the entirety of the workings of government in
China, but as time goes by, the policy-making process is
becoming more compatible with global systems and therefore
more predictable.  Decision-making in China has become less
centralized and more open to international norms.   China
will continue to be ambiguous, complex, and shifting, so we
must continue to study, research, watch, and analyze in
order to not only understand the PRC decision-makers, but
to aid them in the process.  Chinese foreign policy is an
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important aspect of US foreign policy, and thus






























II. CHINA’S LEADERSHIP:  PAST TO PRESENT
A.  HISTORICAL PROCESS OF DECISION-MAKING
In the early decades of the PRC, what mattered was not
an objective standard of legality but moral judgment of
right and wrong according to the Communist Party.  In other
words, there were "rules of the game" by which elite
politics in China were relatively autonomous from society
and hence resistant to change.  The rules by which elite
actors played were not found in a written constitution or
even within formal institutional arrangements at the top of
the system.  They were rather designed by the top party
leaders.  After Mao Zedong died and Hua Guofeng was
promoted to chairman of the Communist Party, there was a
belief in the "two whatevers," which meant whatever
decision Chairman Mao made, the people would resolutely
support, and whatever instructions Chairman Mao made, the
people would steadfastly abide by.1  Thus, the Communist
Party in the early 1950s governed the nation through one
dominant leader who made all the decisions for China and
saw himself as above the law.
 Throughout the decision-making process, Mao made
all the major decisions concerning the implementation of
policy and policy changes.  In the 1960s, Mao typically
made all major decisions by himself and the Politburo
Standing Committee (PBSC) represented only a rubber stamp.2 
Mao, as chairman of the Communist Party and the Party
                    
1 Maurice Meisner,  Mao’s China and After, third edition, (New York:
The Free Press, 1977), 428.
2 Lu Ning,  The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China,
second edition, (Colorado: Westview Press, 2000), 94.
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Central Military Commission (at that time known as the
Military Affairs Commission), dominated foreign policy
decision-making until his death in 1976.  After Mao’s
death, the processes within government began to change in
China.  
Hua Guofeng was installed as the new chairman of the
CCP in 1976, based on what was claimed to be arrangements
made by Mao on his deathbed.  Hua Guofeng won few new
political adherents and found it difficult to fill the
shoes of Mao.   During his short rule, Hua proposed a ten
year plan which quickly proved to be financially unviable
and was soon abandoned.  The abortiveness of Hua’s economic
plan was one main factor in his political demise.  Another
cause leading to Hua’s overthrow was the growing power and
popularity of Deng Xiaoping.3  Deng’s political ambitions
rested on a powerful base of social and political support,
including high-level bereaucrats, old cadres, and PLA
generals.   By 1977, Deng had gained a place at the top of
the political hierarchy, and his power and popularity 
continued to grow over the next decade.
The relationship between Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun, a
well known party elder, had a major impact on the
distribution of power below the apex of the system and on
the decision-making authority within the government.  The
policies of Chen Yun and other conservatives were quite
different from that of Deng.   Deng had a difficult time
trying to dominate China's policy agenda, although he was
determined to do so.   Deng had two subordinates who were
responsible for carrying out reforms, Hu Yaobang and Zhao
                    
3 Maurice Meisner,  Mao’s China and After, third edition, (New York:
The Free Press, 1977), 430.
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Ziyang.  Although Deng depended on them to implement and
enforce policy, these two leaders worked on a different
political level than Deng and Chen, and they were not
allowed to speak to either of them on an equal basis.  Deng
went to great pains to maintain stark differences in
political status between himself and his competitive
compatriots.   
Thus, during the Dengist era there were two important
aspects of political structure.  First was the role of Chen
Yun as a proponent of a policy line that differed
significantly from that espoused by Deng.  Second, there
was the carefully constructed balance that Deng established
in order to maintain the stability of the party while
biasing party structure toward his own policy agenda.4  This
structure was significant because it affected the way
decisions were made during Deng’s rule.  Basically, policy
decisions were made that were suboptimal, because they were
designed to counterattack flaws within the policies and
were based on compromise instead of optimal rewards. 
Although Deng had adversaires within the government who
challenged his role, he still desired to maintain a Mao-
like status regarding decision-making authority.  At this
point, we can begin to see a pattern of change from Mao’s
dominance to Deng’s submission to arbitration while trying
to maintain absolutism.
Deng Xiaoping was determined to reform Chinese society
and the economy, even at the risk of worsening the current
stability in China.  Chen Yun was China’s senior economic
planner, but he did not participate regularly in the policy
                    
4 Josheph Fewsmith,  Elite Politics in Contemporary China, (New York:
M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 50.
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deliberations of the party Secretariat and State Council,
and his roles now appear to have been less important in
many respects to those of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. 
Before the Tiananmen Square tragedy, Hu Yaobang  died of a
heart attack in the spring of 1989.  Hu had been an
advocate of greater political and intellectual freedom.  He
served as a vehicle for frustrated students and
intellectuals to criticize the more conservative
leadership.   Hu had been purged as general secretary in
1987, and his 1989 death touched off the Tiananmen student
demonstrations.  Some students turned the demonstrations
into explicit challenges to the way China was being led. 
The Chinese people were upset about corruption in the
government and soaring inflation as a result of Deng's
reforms.  
The demonstrations, which began in Beijing, soon
spread to other cities.  It is important to note that the
demonstrations were carried out not only by student
protesters, but also by workers, entrepreneurs, and even
many Communist Party officials.  On May 19, 1989, Zhao
Ziyang was removed from power for voicing support for the
students, and martial law was declared in Beijing.  On June
4, PLA troops used much force against the demonstrators and
killed over 330 people, although other estimates put the
deaths much higher - between nine hundred and three
thousand. 5  The decision by Deng to use martial law would
turn out to be a decision that would affect China
internally and internationally for a long time to come.  
The Tiananmen Square incident is a case study all its own,
                    
5  Kenneth Lieberthal,  Governing China; From Revolution Through
Reform, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. 1995), 142.
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but it gives credence to the importance of learning how and
why Chinese leaders make certain critical decisions in
times of crisis.
After the summer of 1989, leaders in the PRC
government realized that changes had to be made or the
consequences could lead to internal collapse.   Deng called
for a period of several years of stability.  Hu Yaobang and
Zhao Ziyang had fallen, and the new comrades who moved to
the fore included Li Peng as Premier, who had been
appointed in 1988, and Jiang Zemin as General Secretary of
the Chinese Communist Party.  
Overall, regarding the historical processes of
decision-making in China, it is important to recognize the
evolution over time.  In Mao’s day, he dominated all
decision-making and emphasized Party control and military
power within the government.  Deng manipulated the system
in order to control the decision-making process, although
he was constantly engaged in struggles with the “rightists”
and hard-liners.  Today, Jiang Zemin has a political style
unknown in China until the late 1990s.  Jiang thus far has
been successful at incorporating other players into the
decision-making process, such as the PBSC and members of
the Central Military Commission (CMC).

B.  THE TRANSITION TO THIRD GENERATION
During the Tiananmen tragedy, Tang Tsou wrote in an
article that "...Chinese political culture has not yet
accepted the politics of compromise that are so vital to
democratic governance."6   In 1997, when Deng died, the
                    
6 Joseph Fewsmith,  Elite Politics in Contemporary China, (New York:
 14

shift from first generation (Mao) to second generation
(Deng) to third generation (Jiang) began to become more
apparent in Chinese politics, as political culture began to
change and compromises within the party became more
necessary.  The way in which Jiang Zemin became head of the
Communist Party and president of China was quite unusual. 
Three weeks prior to convening the Fourth Plenum of the
Thirteenth Central Committee, Deng Xiaoping called Premier
Li Peng and Politburo Standing Committee member Yao Yilin
to inform them that Jiang Zemin would be the next General
Secretary.  Deng said that he had checked with Chen Yun and
Li Xiannian, which gives a fairly accurate account of the
range of consultation needed to make the most critical
decisions in the Party.7  Therefore, regarding top
leadership issues such as the next president or general
secretary, other high ranking members of the Party were not
consulted at all.   This is the type of informal politics
that existed in the PRC during Deng’s rule and that began
to diminish under the authority of Jiang Zemin. 
Additionally, the role of the Central Committee and the
Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) seem to be gaining in
political importance in recent years.
Similarly, foreign policy decision-making has
undergone a period of transition in China.  In the past,
Mao allowed only a limited amount of discussion and debate
among the top leadership regarding China's foreign
policies.  Through the combination of high-level
appointments and military affairs, foreign policy decision-
making became one of the centralized areas in China's
                    
M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 51.
7  Ibid, 55.
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political system.  Mao and the CMC leadership dominated
this aspect of government until his death in 1976.
During and after the Deng era, all major foreign
policy decisions were made by the PBSC or by the paramount
leader with his nuclear circle.  Prior to the Thirteenth
Congress of the CPC in 1987, the Ministerial Party Group,
like the Politburo, was the highest decision making body in
the government bureaucracy.  It consisted of most of the
ministers including vice and assistant ministers.  In the
1980s, all policy matters in state affairs rested with
ministerial leaders.8  Department officials from each
ministerial office had the power to oversee the day-to-day
operations that fell under their respective jurisdiction
under established rules set by the Party.  Even for
decisions with already established rules or precedents, a
proposed course of action would often be referred to the
responsible ministerial leader for ratification.  
Throughout the 1980s, all ministers and at least one
departmental ranking official from every department would
gather for a session at which a briefing would be provided,
similar to a national security briefing to President Bush
by Condaleezza Rice.  Since the ministers are no longer
running the show as far as foreign policy decision-making,
these briefs have since been transformed into a written
report each morning rather than a verbal brief.9  This
indicates that the authority that ministers once held has
been passed on to the Politburo Standing Committee and the
Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group.
                    
8 Lu Ning, The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China,




Since China has greatly expanded its interaction with
the rest of the world and management of foreign relations
has become more complex, the role of the foreign affairs
bureaucracies in decision-making has begun to increase. 
One reason for this is because Jiang’s generation of
leadership has a narrower power base and is therefore more
susceptible to lobbying by bureaucracies. In the past, Mao
or Deng would not have tolerated such interference.
Since the founding of the PRC, important foreign
policy decisions have been made by a leading nuclear
circle, which today is the seven members of the Politburo
Standing Committee.  In the post-Deng era, the
responsibility for making major decisions is with this
leading nuclear circle.  The two leading bodies, the
Secretariat and the PBSC, act as either a rubber stamp to
lend legitimacy to decisions made by the paramount leader,
or they act as a forum for building intra-elite consensus
or coalition.  Essentially, these leaders act as the
command center for directing and implementing major policy
goals.
The emergence of new leaders such as Jiang Zemin, Li
Peng, and Zhu Rongji represent a transition of leadership
from a revolutionary generation to a generation of
technocratic politicians.  These new leaders have been
characterized by a lack of absolute authority of the kind
that existed in Mao’s era.  There is no single leader who
can command unquestioned authority in the party, 
government, or military today.  This has led to a more
collectivized decision-making process through the PBSC,
 17

which in the 1990s began to represent more bureaucratic
interests.
An example of transitional leadership and power within
the PRC was demonstrated when the percentage of military
representatives in the Politburo declined sharply from 31
percent in the 1977 Eleventh Central Committee’s Politburo,
to 11 percent in the Thirteenth, and finally to 8 percent
in the Fifteenth in 1997.  There are no PLA generals today
that serve on the PBSC.  Additionally in 1998, the number
of ministries under the State Council was reduced from 40
to 29.10 
Most of the current leaders were politically
inconspicuous before 1982, and within a decade and a half,
they have risen to China’s top leadership.  Most of these
leaders were only teenagers during the Cultural Revolution,
and therefore they do not carry the revolutionary baggage
of their predecessors.  Jiang Zemin is a third generation
leader in China who has encouraged transformations within
the party and government systems and who has a political
style unlike any of his predecessors.  

C.  JIANG ZEMIN'S POLITICAL STYLE
It has been noted that Jiang Zemin does not hold the
authority of Mao or Deng, and there have been questions
about whether senior political leaders accept his rule. 
Jiang is unable to appeal to historical contributions he
made in the revolution since he was only a student in the
late 1940s.  Instead, he is known to respond to challenges
to his position and authority by invoking rules.  For
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example, in 1992 the Fourteenth Party Congress increased
the overlap between the party and the state by making the
top four members of the Politburo Standing Committee also
heads of the major state organs.  These four members were
Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, Qiao Shi, and Li Ruihuan.  This was
apparently an effort for Jiang to consolidate his own power
and reduce any opposition at the party and state levels.  
Jiang has attempted to differentiate the functions of
the party and the state more than has been done in the past
to ensure a greater role for government in policy-making. 
He has also made the transition from personal to collective
decision-making.  At the Fifteenth Party Congress in 1997,
almost 60 percent of the Central Committee (CC) was
replaced in order to ensure the promotion of younger and
better-educated cadres.  Additionally, at the first session
of the Ninth National People's Congress in 1998 Jiang
announced a major reorganization of the government to
reduce the number of ministries and commissions under the
State Council from forty to twenty-nine and to cut
government personnel by fifty percent.11  It is expected
that Jiang will retire after his present five-year term
because of his age - a criterion that he himself
established in order to make it difficult for people to
stay in political positions past the age of seventy.   
Jiang's initial lack of international experience
restricted his dealings with foreign affairs of the CCP. 
Zhu Rongji, assisted by Qian Qichen, oversaw the foreign
policy of the government and state until Jiang could get up
to speed.  Jiang's leadership appears to rely more on power
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M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 77.
 19

sharing and consensus building rather than on independent
power struggles.  To date, Jiang’s foreign affairs
experience has broadened, allowing him greater involvement
in the process as well as increased confidence in him by
his associates.
When Jiang appointed Hu Jintao as a core member of the
next generation, Jiang somewhat diminished the pressure of
contenders for power among leaders of his own generation,
such as Li Peng, Zhu Rongji, and Li Ruihuan.  Hu Jintao has
been implicitly identified as Jiang’s successor.  For
Jiang, this establishes a boundary between the generations,
identifying himself as part of the third generation, and
declaring that upon his retirement, the fourth generation
leadership will take over.
A recently published book entitled Jiang Zemin's
Counselors lists four people as Jiang's closest political
friends: Wang Daohan, former mayor of Shanghai and the man
who has been in charge of China's negotiations with Taiwan;
Zeng Qinghong, Jiang's longtime assistant and newly elected
Politburo alternate who now runs the powerful Organization
Department of the CCP; Chen Zhili, a new full member of the
Central Committee and the woman who has recently been
chosen to take over the Ministry of Education; and Liu Ji,
former vice president of the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences and coauthor of a well-known article, "On
Scientific Policy-Making," which advocates technocratic
thinking for China's reform.  All four are from Shanghai,
and each has a technical education.12  These four people are
significant in Chinese politics, not because they have any
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direct decision-making authority, but because they have
close enough contact with Jiang Zemin to play an
influential role in guiding his decisions.
Another one of Jiang's close political partners is
Wang Huning, the former president of the East China
Institute of Politics and Law.  Wang now has the official
title "assistant to the president of the PRC," and he
travels with Jiang to foreign countries.
Jiang has not put an ideological stamp on politics as
did his predecessors.  In general, he has taken a middle
course that encompasses a wide spectrum of opinion, from
ideological hard-liners to the "bourgeois liberals."13 
Furthermore, Jiang has distanced himself from Li Peng,
because Li is more cautious about economic reform while
Jiang is eager to restructure the government and the
economy and the relationship between the two.   Therefore,
one could speculate that when a crucial decision has to be
made, one of Jiang’s closest friends probably has more
influence in the process than the Chinese Premier.
Jiang’s perceived thought process is different from
his predecessors in many ways, which could be attributed to
the changing times and the importance placed on economic
relationships.  Jiang apparently considers the importance
of economic growth during times of crisis.  For example,
when the US accidentally bombed the Chinese Embassy in
Belgrade, the PRC leadership quickly realized that US-China
relations were too important to be sacrificed to the
emotions of the moment.  Trade and a stable international
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environment are essential for China's continued economic
development, and domestic stability would be impossible
without economic development.  Thus, economic
considerations influenced the reactions of PRC leaders and
the decision-making process.  We will see that such
considerations also influenced Chinese decision-making
during the EP-3 crisis.
China's foreign policy has always been dictated by
twin sources: the nation's physical security and the
nation's economic development.  During the Mao era, the
nation's physical security was the primary concern, whereas
now, the focus of foreign policy is more on China's
economic development.  As a result of this economic bias,
there has been a decentralization of decision-making power,
particularly in favor of the foreign affairs establishment
at the expense of the central leadership.
The bottom line regarding Jiang’s style of leadership
and the way in which he makes decisions is that he is
considered a reformer among Chinese politicians and is
eager to implement changes within China’s economy,
government, and society.   He consults members of the PBSC,
the top brass of the CMC, and his closest personal friends
to receive guidance on major policy decisions.  This is not
to say that Jiang is not capable of making significant
decisions on his own, but it is clear that he does not hold
power in order to emulate Mao and Deng.  Jiang makes
decisions based on economic growth and what will sustain
China in the future.  Since Jiang became party leader,
China has seen the most stable political situation, its
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greatest national strength, its most active diplomacy, and





                    





A.  STRUCTURE OF THE PARTY AND STATE
The national party congress is the most authoritative
body within the Communist Party and meets once every five
years for approximately ten days.  The Sixteenth National
Party Congress consisting of approximately 2000 delegates,
will meet in the fall of 2002.  The national party congress
has three main tasks.  First, members review the work of
the Communist Party over the preceding five years since the
last congress.  Second, they lay out guidelines for the
work of the party for the next five years.  Finally, they
elect new full members and alternate members of the party
Central Committee.   
The Central Committee (CC) is made up of approximately
190 Communist Party members and ratifies decisions by the
party leadership on behalf of the national party congress. 
The CC meets at least once a year between party congresses. 
CC meetings are called plenums or plenary Sessions, the
first of which begins the day after the national party
congress meeting has ended.  Other departments below the CC
include the Organization Department, the General Office,
the Propaganda Department, the United Front Work
Department, the International Liaison department, the party
newspaper Renmin Ribao, its journal Qiu Shi, and finally
the Political Bureau (Politburo).  
The Organization Department keeps track of the careers
of members in the party, including promotions and
demotions, although this department has no real decision-
making power.   The General Office is responsible for the
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administrative work of the party.  Those who work in the
General Office hold high security clearances and powerful
positions because they handle sensitive paperwork that is
not available to all party members.  The Propaganda
Department relays the public message of the Communist Party
and governs radio and television throughout the nation. 
The United Front Work Department is the link between the
party and labor unions and religious associations.  It
relays the interests and concerns of the workers to the
party leadership and identifies any problems that the
leaders should know about.  The International Liaison
Department handles external relations within the department
and today is a less insignificant component of China's
foreign policy than in the past.  The Renmin Ribao is the
People's Daily Communist Party newspaper, which is the most
important publication in China.  Another publication is Qiu
Shi, which means "seeking truth" and which has been the
party journal since 1988.   The role of these and other
sources of media will be explained in greater detail in
Chapter IV.
Finally, the Politburo is the seat of decision-making
in the central leadership and is responsible for political
affairs when the CC is not in session.  There are
approximately 20-25 members in the Politburo.  The regular
members of the Politburo hold key positions in virtually
every important political body in China.  The General
Secretary Jiang Zemin presides over the Politburo meetings.  
Within the Politburo is the Politburo Standing Committee
(PBSC), which is made up of seven people and which
generally meets once a week.  These seven individuals are
the true decision-making core in China.  It is understood
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that the Politburo Standing Committee is usually the de
facto decision-making center, even though the CCP’s
constitution states that the Central Committee is the
superior power organ.15  
The PBSC since 1992 includes the general secretary of
the CPC (Jiang Zemin), the chairman of the CMC (Jiang
Zemin), the PRC state president (Jiang Zemin), the chairman
of the standing committee of the national people's congress
(Li Peng), and the chairman of the Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference (Li Ruihuan).  Since the
15th Party Congress in 1997, the PBSC is made up of Jiang
Zemin, Li Peng, Premiere Zhu Rongji, Li Ruihuan, Hu Jintao,
Wei Jianxing, and Li Lanqing.  Wei Jianxing is secretary of
the Central Discipline Inspection Committee and Li Lanqing
is vice premier.16  
The Secretariat is the executive political arm of the
Communist Party, consisting of six to ten members, which
oversee the implementation of PBSC decisions.  The
Secretariat is responsible in general for overseeing policy
implementation.  Implementation itself and decision-making
authority regarding policy details belong to respective
party, military, and government agencies and their party
groups.  Therefore, the Secretariat is not officially a
decision-making body.
The seven Politburo Standing Committee members are the
leadership core and the supreme policy-making body, and
they are responsible for making major policies of wide
                    
15 Carol Lee Hamrin and Suisheng Zhao, ed, Decision-Making in Deng’s
China; Perspectives from Insiders, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 26.
16 Lu Ning, The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China,
(Colorado: Westview Press, 2000), 7.
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ranging and far-reaching impact.  The Secretariat is led by
the general secretary, who is without exception also a
member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo.  The
Secretariat is responsible for making routine decisions
with regard to the overall work of the party and the state,
but these major policy decisions are reserved for the 20-25
members of the Politburo.
Although the Politburo and Secretariat meetings are
the official venues for making important decisions, most
decisions of secondary importance are made on paper through
endorsing or rejecting a “request for information” (RFI) by
the PBSC.  Usually a PB meeting would not be convened for a
decision of secondary importance.  An example of a decision
of secondary importance would be how to handle the 1983
hijacking of a Chinese domestic flight.  The Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA) Department of Soviet and East
European Affairs drafted an RFI to turn over the hijacker
to the Russians.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
leadership signed on to the idea and submitted it to the
central leadership for endorsement.  This issue was
considered tactical and was handled at the MFA level
because it did not concern China’s fundamental interests or
directly affect China’s foreign policy.17  This thesis
however, will focus on decisions made during crises that do
affect foreign policy and national security, and therefore
involve the most important bureaucracies and political
leaders in China.
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There is a distinction between Party structure and
state structure.  When someone refers to the government of
the PRC or the NPC, they are talking about the state, not
the Communist Party.  The structure of the state parallels
that of the party and begins with the National People's
Congress (NPC), which is made up of 3,000 people, all
members delegated by the Party.  The NPC meets once a year
each spring.  The members review what the government has
done over the past year and lay out priorities for the next
year.  It appoints a new National People’s Congress
Standing Committee (NPCSC) every five years. 
Constitutionally, the NPC is the “highest organ of state
power” in China, and “exercises the legislative power of
the state.”  It has the power “to decide on questions of
war and peace.”18  In reality though, the NPC has not been
very influential in most cases in the past, but in recent
years it has become more active and vocal.  
The NPCSC is made up of 125 delegates that meet on
average once a month on behalf of the NPC.  They elect the
State Council members and ministers of all thirty
ministries.  The State Council is the top executive organ
of the state and the premier state administrative organ. 
Under the State Council there are several state
commissions, such as the State Planning Commission and the
State Economic and Trade Commission.  The top leadership of
the state consists of the premier of the State Council Zhu
Rongji, the chairman of the NPC, Li Peng, and the president
of the PRC, Jiang Zemin, which is only a ceremonial post. 
                    
18 A. Doak Barnett, The Making of Foreign Policy In China; Structure
and Process,  (Colorado:  Westview Press, 1985), 29.
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The premier is involved in the actual day-to-day governance
of China.
One of the State Council’s basic problems in dealing
with all policy areas is how to coordinate effectively the
activities of the numerous government ministries,
commissions, and other organizations operating in
particular fields.  In the past there were coordinating
points called “staff offices”, but these no longer exist. 
Today, coordinating points are called kou which means
“opening” or “channel”.   In other words, the Chinese bring
together many units or state offices under one coordinating
office.  These coordination points are headed by vice-
premiers, which demonstrates how government work is
channeled upward to top levels.  
As far as decision-making authority, the PBSC makes
decisions, then uses the state through the State Council to
implement decisions.  The Secretariat oversees the
implementation of Politburo decisions.  Under the
Secretariat there are sub-groups such as the Foreign
Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG), now led by Jiang
Zemin.  These sub-groups will be covered in detail in the
third section of this chapter.  
Provincial politics in China is set up similarly to
state and party politics.  There is a provincial party
congress, provincial party committee, standing committee
presided over by a secretary, and a provincial people's
government presided over by a governor, as well as bureaus,
organizations and departments.  Each province has its own
newspaper that speaks for the party in that locale.  
Additionally, each province is a military district presided
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over by a commander and political commissar who ensures the
political reliability of PLA troops and conducts party
education.  The Bureaus and offices within the provinces
report to the provincial people's government or to a party
committee, but they also report to the equivalent body at
the national level.   Many provinces are very large, and
some consist of approximately 100 million people or more. 
Decision-making at the provincial level is limited to local
affairs, but the organization of the system is important
because it demonstrates how information and authority
travel up to the top leaders in the national government.
China's political community is divided into those who
belong to the Communist Party and those who are not
members.  Those who are Communist Party members have more
obligations, but also more influence and privileges.  China
has a bottom-up system where responsibility is deferred up,
so all the power is at the top within the Politburo and
particularly within the Politburo Standing Committee. 
Decision-making often gets paralyzed at the top and leads
to inefficiencies in the system.

B.  THE CHINESE STAFF SYSTEM
The Chinese staff system is important because it is a
mechanism for bureaucratic control, and it reveals the
function of counterbureaucracies in China.  The staff
system operates through the general office at various
levels.  It is like a subunit to a bureaucracy and provides
leaders with a contervailing base of expertise and
information to effectively control the bureaucracy.19  The
                    




staff system also works to integrate bureaucracies by
creating a horizontal as well as vertical organization
throughout the political system.  The personnel that head
these general offices are as important as the offices
themselves, because they have immediate access to the
highest levels of government and the most prominant party
members.  Thus, the names discussed in this section will
arise again when considering who in China has decision-
making authority and who has the greatest influence over
those key decision makers.
General offices (GOs) in China are responsible for
coordinating, on a day-to-day basis, virtually every aspect
of the work and the interpersonal relations among political
elites and between the leading and the led.  GOs are said
to be the principal source of information for PRC leaders. 
The GO system is situated at the very core of the Chinese
authority structure and is one of the most secretive organs
in the Chinese political system.20
The Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, the
State Council, the standing committee of the NPC, and the
Central Military Commission (CMC) each has a GO within
which work staffs of secretaries (mishu).  These offices
collect, analyze, verify, transmit and store information. 
Additionally, they conduct research and investigate as well
as provide options and advice for policy making.  The GO
secretaries also look after the personal needs of high-
level PRC leaders.   Altogether there are close to a
million GO personnel in the Chinese political system. 




However, at the prefecture-level, there are only
approximately forty GOs.  
The Central Committee GO supports the central
leadership who not only wield command over the various
departments directly under the Central Committee, but also
control the party committee systems which are integrated
into the State Council and the National People's Congress. 
The CC GO has had the added important duty of coordinating
communication between the Politburo and the political
elders whose role in policy making is increasingly
diminishing.  There are approximately one thousand people
in the Central GO.21  In the Central GO there is a GO
director in charge of all staff work and daily operations. 
Jiang Zemin has recently appointed his protégé, Zeng
Zinghong, to be director of the Central GO.
In the Central leadership squad, the three types of
leadership bodies are the Politburo, Central Secretariat,
and the Central squad-level Leading Small Groups (LSGs). 
They all have two features in common: they are composed
basically of Central leaders, and their members meet only
at scheduled meetings and events.  It is the GO head's job
to contact, negotiate with, and bargain with his
counterpart or other leaders of the other units.
In the State Council GO, there is a "chief mishu," who
is currently Luo Gan.  Evidence suggests that in terms of
political and administrative support, the State Council
General Office performs basically the same staff services
for the State Council leadership squad, which consists of




the premier, vice-premiers, and state councilors as the
central leadership squad.22  
The Central Military Commission has both a GO director
and a chief mishu.  The GO director leads the leadership
squad, while the chief mishu leads the mishu squad.  The
leadership squad is entitled to make defense related
decisions and the mishu squad is to assist the decision-
making process and supervise the implementation of
decisions.
A GO plays a major role in policy formation, by
providing options and advice so that leaders can make
informed decisions.  As the decision-making process in
China becomes more decentralized, the GO role will be
reinforced in order to maintain control and coordination
among Chinese bureaucracies.  Since leaders meet only at
certain times, GO members keep the lines of communication
open and synchronize their actions.  Although GO members
have no decision-making authority themselves, they keep the
system running smoothly by helping to avoid further
inefficiencies in the PRC decision-making process.

C.  PRC SUB-ARENAS AND MILITARY INFLUENCE
According to the analysis of RAND analyst Michael
Swaine, there are four sub-arenas within the PRC government
relevant to security policy.  They are: 1) the national
strategic objectives sub-arena; 2) the foreign policy sub-
arena; 3) the defense policy sub-arena; and 4) the
strategic, research, analysis, and intelligence sub-arena. 
The national strategic objectives sub-arena consists of




those who have supreme power over the Communist Party,
state and military.  This consists of Jiang Zemin, his
advisors, senior associates on the Politburo Standing
Committee (PBSC), and any influential retired elders from
the revolutionary generation (although the most well known
elders died in the late 1990s).  The members of the
national strategic objectives sub-arena respond to major
external crises.  Today, there is no single individual
leader in China who wields predominant influence in times
of an internal or external crisis.  
Military involvement varies among the four sub-arenas,
even though Deng Xiaoping allowed PLA officials to become
officially involved in government affairs in 1992.  As a
result, ten PLA generals began attending PBSC meetings. 
Although there is military representation within the
national strategic objectives sub-arena, it is only a
select few who actually have the authority to make
decisions regarding China's national security.23  
Today there are four individuals who make up an
informal national security directorate within the national
strategic objectives sub-areana:  Jiang Zemin as head of
the CMC, Communist Party, and PBSC, Li Peng as chairman of
the NPCSC and head of the foreign policy system, Zhang
Wannian as a PLA general and member of the Politburo, and
Chi Haotian, another PLA general and China's defense
minister.   Zhang and Chi are both in their sixties and
have served as deputy CMC heads since 1995.  Typically,
these two PLA generals make all major decisions on defense
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policy.24   Chi and Zhang are the two top military officers
who are also members of the Fifteenth CC Poliburo, but
neither is on the PBSC.  
These four are well known individuals within the PRC
leadership and are considered the key decision-makers
regarding national strategic objectives in China.  Jiang
Zemin and Li Peng are familiar names throughout this study,
and they are essentially known throughout the world as
China's top leaders.   It has been reported that China's
collective leadership generally requires face-to-face
meetings among senior members to reach a consensus on major
issues.  Therefore, it can be assumed that these four men
met together before a decision was made regarding the EP-3
incident.  If such a meeting did occur during that crisis,
Zhang Wannian was not present since he was reportedly
traveling when the incident occurred.  It should be noted
that Jiang Zemin ordered the PLA out of the business of
government affairs in 1998, but the extent to which that
has actually happened remains to be seen.25  
In the foreign policy sub-arena, members from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Foreign Affairs Leading
Small Group (FALSG) make most of the decisions, which are
then approved by the PBSC (usually with little
deliberation).  It is important to note that the PLA plays
no role in the foreign policy sub-arena.  Prior to 1998 Li
Peng dominated the foreign policy sub-arena and had much
influence over China's foreign policy issues.  Since then,
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Jiang Zemin has taken over China’s foreign policy issues
but continues to consult Li Peng on foreign policy
dilemmas, but it has been reported that tension and
competition exists between the two powerful leaders.26  
The defense policy sub-arena is often called the
"military policy" or "military strategy" realm in China. 
The main decision makers in this sub-arena regarding
military policy issues are Jiang Zemin, Gen. Zhang Wannian
and Gen. Chi Haotian.  These three men make up what is
known as the informal executive committee of the CMC. 
Jiang is head of the CMC and Chi and Zhang are CMC deputy
chairmen.  Jiang Zemin usually does not attend CMC meetings
on a regular basis, but will send a close aide on his
behalf who will report back to him.27  The CMC is the
dominant structure below the Politburo or PBSC.  The most
important PLA organizations involved in foreign relations
are the CMC and the General Staff Department (GSD).  The
CMC has only five offices and approximately 100 people, but
it is the supreme organization responsible for determining
policy for the PLA.  It is similar to the FALSG, but ranks
higher or is equal to the State Council.  Each of the three
members of the CMC executive committee also heads a
committee or small group within the CMC which is
responsible for making specific military policies.  Hu
Jintao is the Vice Chairman of the CMC, but so far he has
little influence in defense decision-making because, like
Jiang, he has no military background and has not yet been
integrated into this realm of the party.  
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The most influential organization next to the CMC as
part of the military structure is the GSD, which provides
the greatest amount of input into defense policies.28 
Members of the GSD have the authority to replace or
reshuffle key PLA officials (with the support of the party
leadership).   The GSD has become increasingly important in
policy implementation and in shaping high-level decision-
making.  The PLA Foreign Affairs Office belongs to the GSD,
but administratively serves the CMC, GSD, and the Ministry
of National Defense (MND).
In times of crisis it appears that the four members of
the informal national security directorate (Jiang Zemin, Li
Peng, Zhang Wannian, and Chi Haotian) are the supreme
decision makers on how Beijing will react.  However, during
the 1989 Tiananmen Square crisis, a temporary Military
Affairs Leading Small Group (MALSG) was established to
advise the CMC on appropriate military actions to take.29 
After the Tiananmen incident was over, this temporary group
was abolished, but it is possible (yet undocumented) that a
similar situation occurred during the EP-3 incident in
which a MALSG may have been established to aid Jiang in his
decision-making process.  PRC authorities secretly created
a crisis management team consisting of officials in charge
of politics, foreign policy, and military affairs in 2001
to deal with crises at the national level.  This team is
known as the Central Leading Group for Security Work and is
modeled after the U.S.National Security Council.  The group
apparently consists of Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, Qian Qichen,






Zhang Wannian, and Xiong Guangkai.   Also, another group
has been created to focus solely on foreign affairs issues
and consists of Jiang, Zhu Rongji, and Qian Qichen.30  Not
much is known about the status of either of these groups or
what role they played in the EP-3 incident.
Finally, in the strategy, research, analysis, and
intelligence sub-arena there are no key decision makers. 
However, there is one person--Lieutenant General Xiong
Guangkai, mentioned above who is very close to Jiang Zemin
on a personal level and provides him with military
intelligence and information about the state of the PLA
regarding military modernization, troop morale, and
corruption within the top ranks of PLA leadership.  Gen.
Xiong is also the point of contact for Sino-American
military-to-military dialogue.
The military structure begins with the Central
Military Commission (CMC), previously known as the MAC. 
Under the CMC is the General Staff Department (GSD),
General Logistics Department (GLD), General Political
Department (GPD), and the General Armament/Equipment
Department (GAD), created in 1998.  Under each of these
departments, there are twenty-four group armies, within
seven military regions each of which has GSD, GLD, and GPD
commanders.  Additionally, there are thirty-one military
districts within the seven regions.  
The Communist Party CMC is a party body and is not an
arm of the state, although there is also an identical state
CMC.  Members of the CMC are appointed by the Central
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Committee rather than the National People’s Congress.   The
current members of the CMC (both the Communist Party CMC
and the State CMC have identical membership) are Jiang
Zemin, Zhang Wannian, Chi Haotian, Fu Quanyou, You Yongbo,
Wang Ke, Wang Ruilin, Cao Gangchuan.  The CMC members come
up with a five-year defense plan, which is then reviewed
and adopted by the state.
Jiang Zemin no longer attends working-level CMC
meetings, but he does make high-profile appearances at
important military events to show that he is paying
attention to military affairs.  Because Jiang is
preoccupied with party and state affairs, Chi and Zhang
have been given autonomy to run the CMC.31   Zhang is not on
the PBSC, so he has few personal ties with any of its
members.  His influence with the party leadership is
instead through his official position on the full Politburo
and, perhaps more important, as a member of the party
Secretariat.  
The primary contribution of the Chinese military high
command has been to avoid taking any actions that might
lead to military tensions that could lead to a lessening of
foreign investments.32  It does not want to take any action
that may have an adverse impact on China's economy.  This
is a different stance by the military compared to Mao’s 
rule because the military at that time had more power
within the political system, whereas now they are more
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firmly controlled by the Communist Party which guides the
national economy.
There is only a limited amount of detailed research
and analysis of broad political-military and military-
strategic issues done in China by working-level military
professionals or civilian political-military analysts
specifically to provide a basis for China’s top decision-
makers to deal with foreign policy issues.  Thus, the
contribution that the military makes to recommending
policies is small.33
In general, the decision-making authority in China
does not rest solely with the PBSC, although this is mostly
the view presented to the public.  There is a collective
leadership composed of senior party and military leaders
who contribute to national strategic and security
decisions.  The PLA itself is involved in military policy,
but has very little involvement in foreign policy issues. 
The PLA was involved in the 1995-1996 Taiwan Straits crisis
decision-making primarily because the incident gave the
military an opportunity to ask the party for additional
funding.  According to James Mulvenon of RAND, "The PLA has
gone from being a mile wide and an inch deep in influence,
to being a mile deep and an inch wide...its direct
intervention has narrowed," with a focus on defense issues. 
Denny Roy claims that the military and civilian leadership
are in a constant bargaining mode.  In the future, if the
party elite becomes divided on external issues and
decisions, the military will likely be more compelled to




get involved in order to protect its own interests, but as
of now, its influence is limited.


D.  THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS STRUCTURE
The governing system of the PRC consists of the
Communist Party, the government or state, and the military. 
At the apex of these systems is the Politburo of the
Chinese Communist Party.  Each sector of the Chinese
political system is supervised by one of the seven members
of the Standing Committee of the Politburo.  These sectors
are: military affairs, legal affairs, administrative
affairs, propaganda affairs, united front affairs, and mass
organization affairs.34  These are informal sectors that do
not appear on organizational charts, but they allow the
PBSC to exercise centralized control over the whole
political system and its processes.  
In 1995, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Li Peng made
up of a small group, known as the leadership nuclear
circle.35  After the election of Zhu Rongji as premier and
Li Peng's move to head the National People's Congress in
March 1998, Li, though retaining the official number two
position within the Party, saw his policy role diminish
while Zhu's role increased.  Therefore, by 1999, most of
the important decisions on foreign and defense policy
issues were made by Jiang and Zhu in conjunction with their
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Politburo Standing Committee colleagues.  Thus, de facto
foreign policy decision-making power rests with the PBSC.  
Jiang Zemin is in charge of foreign affairs as head of
the Central Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG). 
Normally Qian Qichen makes day-to-day decisions regarding
foreign affairs while referring major decisions to Jiang
and Zhu or the PBSC.   Qian Qichen ascended to leadership
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in 1982.  He was
subsequently elected at the 12th Party Congress as a CCP
Central Committee member.  Qian quickly became a vice
foreign minister and later minister.  There are clear
channels and procedures for policy making and decision
making within the MFA.
Although the LSG is not officially a decision-making
body, some decisions are in fact made during LSG meetings. 
Decisions at this level often involve cross-ministerial
jurisdiction or interest.  The principal function of the
FALSG is to exchange views, to study problems, and to
communicate; it does not decide what concrete measures are
to be taken.  The LSG provides a forum for top decision
makers and top professional bureaucrats to meet face to
face, thus the policy preferences and recommendations made
by the LSG have an important impact on the outcome of final
decisions.  Therefore, the FALSG plays a pivotal role in
the decision-making process, regarding analysis and
recommendations.  
Another part of the foreign affairs structure is the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).  As of 1990, the MFA is
one of the largest central bureaucracies, with a staff size
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at 2,660 people.36  The MFA plays the role of policy
interpretation and as information provider for the central
leadership.  Additionally, the MFA conducts diplomatic
affairs on behalf of the state.  This was demonstrated in
Hainan when all negotiations between US Embassy officials
and the PRC had first to channel through a representative
of the MFA.  Of the numerous internal affairs departments,
only the Confidential Communications Bureau and the
Personnel Department have some relevance to the foreign
policy process, as well as the International Liaison
Department.    If a proposed course of action would require
cooperation or acknowledgment of any other department
within the MFA, a telephone discussion with the relevant
division of the department concerned is often initiated to
obtain general endorsement.
If a foreign policy is being initiated, the relevant
department takes the lead in drafting an RFI proposing a
specific course of action, then will submit it to the FALSG
for approval.  The head of the FALSG (Jiang Zemin) can
either approve it or submit it to other members of the PBSC
for ratification or approval.  If the issue is significant,
the leading nuclear circle may call for a meeting of the
PBSC or the entire Politburo to make a final decision.
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IV.  CASE STUDY
A.  APRIL 2001 EP-3 INCIDENT
On April 1, 2001, China and the United States became
engaged in a crisis for the first time since 1996.  It will
be useful to begin with a chronology of the Sino-U.S.
controversy over the April 1 collision between a U.S. Navy
EP-3 and a Chinese F-8 over the South China Sea:
April 1: A Chinese F-8 fighter jet crashed into the
South China Sea after a mid-air collision with a U.S. Navy
EP-3.  The damaged EP-3 made an emergency landing on Hainan
Island without permission.  President Bush demanded
immediate return of the 24 crew members and access to the
U.S. plane.
April 2: U.S. diplomats from the American Embassy in
Beijing traveled to Hainan to begin negotiations and
checkthe condition of the aircrew.
April 3: Jiang Zemin stated that Beijing demanded an
apology from the United States.  Ambassador Prueher
indicated that Chinese military experts have inspected the
plane.   Meanwhile, a White House spokesperson stated
publicly that Washington did not intend to apologize.  U.S.
diplomats had first contact with the EP-3 crew.
April 4: Jiang Zemin again demanded an apology. 
Secretary of State Colin Powell expressed regret over the
missing Chinese pilot.  Jiang Zemin left China to go on a
tour of South America.
April 5: President Bush expressed his regret over the
incident, but still refused to issue an apology.  He said,
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“I regret that a Chinese pilot is missing, and I regret one
of their airplanes was lost, and our prayers go out to the
pilot and his family.”  
April 6: Second meeting between U.S. diplomats and
EP-3 crew members.  
April 7: Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen sent a
letter to the U.S. State Department via Yang Jiechi, the
Chinese ambassador to the United States, stating that the
U.S. response to the collision was unacceptable and
demanding an apology.  U.S. officials refused to apologize. 
A third meeting between U.S. diplomats and EP-3 crew was
held.
April 8: No action
April 9: Both sides began working on a joint
statement to end the crisis.  The fourth meeting between
U.S. diplomats and aircrew was held.  
April 10: Fifth meeting with aircrew.  China still
demanded a full apology from the United States.  
April 11: China acknowledged that fighter pilot, Wang
Wei was dead, beginning to prepare the public for an end to
the crisis.  The standoff ended when Ambassador Prueher
presented a letter stating the United States was “very
sorry” for the loss of the Chinese pilot and for landing at
Lingshui military base, on the southern tip of Hainan,
without permission.  Additionally, an April 18 meeting was
set up to discuss the return of the aircraft to the United
States.  China announced that the crew could leave Hainan.
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April 12: The EP-3 crew was taken from Hainan and
flown to Hawaii, via Guam.37
There were several issues of contention regarding the
EP-3 collision that occurred in April 2001.  First, was the
United States spying on China?  Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld explained to Chinese leaders that the U.S. Navy
was conducting reconnaissance, which means to inspect or
explore an area.  The U.S. EP-3 was flying an overt
reconnaissance and surveillance mission in international
airspace in an aircraft clearly marked “United States
Navy.” It was on a well-known flight path that had been
used for decades.  Many countries perform such flights,
including China.  According to Beijing’s logic, however,
had there been no surveillance by U.S. aircraft, then no
collision would have occurred.  Thus, China judged itself
blameless for the collision over the South China Sea, and
considered U.S. conduct antagonistic because, according to
the Chinese, there was no reason for the United States to
collect intelligence on “peaceful China.”  
A second issue of conflict was whether PRC airspace
had been violated.  It is well understood in international
agreements that an aircraft in distress broadcast its
situation on accepted international channels.  The U.S. EP-
3 followed these guidelines, but it received no response
from the military command at Lingshui.  The only other
option was to crash into the sea, and so the EP-3 conducted
an emergency landing on Hainan Island.  Upon landing, the
aircraft and crew were met by members of the People’s
                    




Liberation Army/Navy  (PLA-N) who were obviously expecting
their arrival.
Finally, there was the question of who was at fault
for the collision.  According to interviews with the EP-3
crew, the F-8 pilot made two aggressive passes at the EP-3. 
On one pass, the pilot, Commander Wang Wei came within an
estimated three to five feet of the aircraft.  On the third
pass, he approached too fast and closed on the EP-3, flying
into the propeller of the outer left engine, causing a
violent turn to the left and a sharp drop in the wing after
Wang’s vertical stabilizer poked a hole in the EP-3’s
aileron.  This occurred approximately 70 nautical miles
from Hainan.  The F-8 broke into two pieces, and plunged
into the South China Sea.  Meanwhile, the nose cone of the
EP-3 broke away and the left inboard engine and a propeller
on the right side of the aircraft were damaged.  According
to the EP-3 crew, this was not the first time that U.S.
reconnaissance and surveillance flights flying in that area
witnessed similar types of aggressive contact from Chinese
interceptors.  
Beijing had been sending explicit warnings to the
United States that they did not approve of U.S.
surveillance flights in the South China Sea.  According to
U.S. Embassy officials, these warnings had been
communicated for several months before the incident
occurred.38  It can be speculated that Beijing could have
been telling the United States that if these flights
continued, something bad was going to happen.   In December
2000, the United States had filed a complaint regarding the
                    




dangerous approaches conducted by Chinese fighters at U.S.
aircraft, but no response was ever received from China. 
With this background in mind, it is unknown whether the F-8
pilot Wang Wei was given an order from Beijing to fly
aggressively at the American plane.  High-level officials
from both the United States and China agree that the
collision was an accident and was likely not an order from
the PRC government.   
Once the US EP-3 landed on Hainan, PLA officials took
over the scene, detaining the aircrew immediately.  At this
time, the PLA made an uncoordinated pronouncement of anger
about the incident, which later put the government in a
position to defend the PLA’s initial behavior.39  Even if
PRC officials had wanted to handle the incident
differently, they were already a step behind the military’s
reaction.  Jiang Zemin had to carefully balance his
response with what the military had already announced.  
When the incident initially occurred, PLA officials
reported the accident to officials in Beijing.   It is
likely that the highest-ranking officer at Lingshui
airfield contacted the General Staff Department directly,
who then contacted the CMC staff members, who in turn
called senior government officials in Beijing.  Therefore,
the report passed through many layers of the PLA before
reaching civilian authorities.  Presumably, the story given
to PRC officials by the PLA was not entirely accurate,
since it was reported so quickly after having just
happened, without any investigation into the details of the
collision.  The PLA likely posed a story making the U.S.
                    
39 Opinions derived from interviews with Naval Attaches at the
American Embassy in Beijing, Oct. 2001.
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crew look as if they caused the incident and illegally
landed on Chinese territory after having spied on China, an
account probably derived from an eye-witness account of the
flight leader who survived and landed at Lingshui in
advance of the crippled EP-3.  At this point, PRC officials
actually became boxed in, since the PLA had already cast
blame and established an uncoordinated response.  Once
official negotiations began in Hainan, the MFA had to
negotiate with the PLA just as much as it was negotiating
with U.S. officials.  MFA officials probably had limited
influence, but since they were the only point of contact
for U.S. officials, they had to make do.
It is not known what exactly the PLA reported to PRC
officials, although it was evident that the PLA was running
the show on Hainan Island.  There were PLA representatives
at negotiation meetings with U.S. Navy officials, although
they did not speak at all during the meetings.  Their
presence alone demonstrated the reality of their
involvement and, certainly, their eagerness to control the
situation on their own.  
When the final decision was made to release the crew,
it is speculated that Jiang Zemin spoke to top PLA
officials because the military was extremely upset about
the incident and demanded maximum benefit from the US
mishap.  Additionally, Jiang probably agreed to meet the
PLA’s minimum demands in exchange for low-level PLA
involvement.  Overall, the EP-3 incident suggests that the
civilian leadership in Beijing was dependent on the PLA for
intelligence, and that the PLA misled PRC officials
regarding who was at fault for the accident.
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There were many players involved in the negotiations
to resolve the mishap.  The challenge now is to peel back
the onion to see who in the PRC government talked to whom,
and who made final decisions.  There were essentially three
groups and locations where negotiations were taking place. 
First, in Washington, DC, there were talks between the
Chinese Ambassador Yang Jiechi and high-level players such
as Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security
Advisor, Condaleezza Rice.  Yang met with U.S. Department
of State officials the day of the accident, and although he
did not make any direct decisions regarding the release of
the crew, he did give significant input to Beijing that
probably accelerated their release based on advice he was
receiving in the United States and passing back to
officials in China. 
Second, there were representatives from the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in Hainan that met with the U.S.
Defense Attaché at the American Embassy in Beijing, Army
Brigadier General Sealock, and other U.S. military
representatives stationed in China, including U.S. consular
Officer Ted Gong.  The PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman was
Zhu Bangzao who spoke on behalf of the Foreign Ministry and
declared that the United States should bear full
responsibility for the incident, but Zhu himself had no
actual decision-making authority.   Usually during times of
crisis, the Foreign Ministry is pushed out in front to deal
with the other party while the real decisions are being
made behind the scenes at a higher level.  Overall, MFA
negotiators are held on a tight leash.  The U.S. officials
In Hainan were conducting negotiations for release of the
crew and addressing the conditions of the crew, ensuring
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they were being fed and treated properly, as well as
negotiating such things as the amount of email they were
allowed to receive or send.   
Finally and most importantly, there was a group in
Beijing which included Ambassador Prueher from the U.S.
side and Vice Foreign Minister Zhou Wenzhong from the
Chinese side.  Behind the scenes were other higher level
leaders such as Jiang Zemin, Qian Qichen, and Hu Jintao. 
Nevertheless, the PRC leadership did not meet directly or
even speak directly with the U.S. ambassador.  Each
decision was reportedly made in Beijing at the highest
level, and then passed on to the MFA in Hainan or to the
State Department via Zhou Wenzhong.  Additionally, General
Xiong Guangkai (the close friend of Jiang mentioned above)
was the most senior officer on an interagency task force
set up to deal with the spy plane incident.  It is unknown
how much influence Xiong had in the decision-making
process.
Although it appeared that Jiang Zemin was making the
final decisions on what China would do with the EP-3 crew
members, Jiang did not have a clear mandate to decide on
his own what to do in times of crisis.   Jiang had already
issued statements regarding China's reactions and
expectations of the U.S. government.  It would have been
awkward for him to back-pedal, especially since he is not
considered a particularly strong leader by the people and
is the first PRC top leader who did not come up from
military ranks.   Jiang may have feared that if his
response was too weak, there would be public opprobrium and
an unfavorable reaction by the PLA, and if his response
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were too strong, there could be potential unrest
internationally.  The PLA and other hard-liners were
pressuring Jiang into taking a tough stance against the
United States.  
It is speculated by State Department sources that a
crisis management team was set up which consisted of Jiang
Zemin, Qian Qichen, Fu Quanyou, and Hu Jintao.  It is
possible, but unconfirmed, that other members of the team
could have included Chi Haotian, Xiong Guangkai, and Tang
Jiaxuan.  The Chinese are good at controlling their
communications pathways.  It is difficult to know who
speaks to whom at the top.  This is probably because it is
never the same people and the process changes depending on
the situation.   This is likely another reason why it takes
so long for the Chinese to make a clear-cut decision.  In
China, it is inherently dangerous to make a decision where
the tables may turn and one may regret having a direct
association with a decision that is later deemed wrong.
Zhu Rongji is China's premier, but as head of the
FALSG Jiang handled the crisis with diplomatic advisor and
Vice Premier, Qian Qichen.  The Central Leading Group for
Security Work, which was mentioned above, met during the
initial days of the crisis to determine how to handle the
situation (Zhang Wannian was absent during the crisis and
was replaced by chief of the GSD, Fu Quanyou, and by Guo
Boxiong.  Guo is expected to be a future senior military
leader in the PLA).  Jiang and Qian Qichen then left for a
trip to Latin America on 4 April.  It can be speculated
that Jiang gave marching orders before he left, and leaving
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the country demonstrated his confidence that the situation
would unfold smoothly.
On April 4, Jiang laid out four conditions for
resolution to the crisis.  The military and civilian
leadership was united behind the four conditions:  the
United States must 1) apologize for the collision; 2) give
an explanation of the incident; 3) provide compensation for
China’s losses; and 4) halt all future reconnaissance
flights.40  Obviously, Jiang relaxed his demands since none
of these conditions were met before the release of the
crew.
Qian and Secretary of State Colin Powell exchanged
letters during the initial days of the crisis, and Qian
made a public statement which said that China did not want
to damage Sino-U.S. relations.  Once Jiang was ready to
leave the country, he asked Vice President Hu Jintao to
take charge of negotiations with the Bush Administration. 
It is believed by some analysts that the basic plan was
hammered out before Jiang left the country.41  According to
high-level sources in Beijing, the Chinese leadership’s
tough line was decided at a combined meeting of the CMC and
the PBSC just before Jiang departed for a 12-day sojourn to
Latin America on April 4.42  There is also sufficient
evidence to believe that the final decisions were made on a
day-to-day basis via long distance phone calls to and from
Jiang.
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  There were two major decisions to be made by Chinese
officials: 1) if and when to release the crew; and 2) if
and when to return the plane to the United States.  The
main decision of when to release the crew was not made by
the MFA, but rather was made in Beijing and relayed to the
MFA in Hainan.  Negotiations took eleven days, which seemed
too long to Americans, but which is actually quite speedy
for the Chinese.  In the case of the EP-3 incident, it
would not have been prudent for PRC leaders to nit-pick the
details for any longer than was absolutely necessary.
 Finally, on April 11, 2001, a letter was sent to
Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Tang from Ambassador
Joseph Prueher stating: “Both President Bush and Secretary
of State Powell have expressed their sincere regret over
your missing pilot and aircraft.  Please convey to the
Chinese people and to the family of pilot Wang Wei that we
are very sorry for their loss.”43  It is believed that the
final draft of the letter was approved in advance by both
Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, although there is no hard
evidence to support this.44  There was no PBSC meeting to
discuss the apology letter.  The final letter that was
accepted was the fourth draft, including painstakingly
constructed diplomatic language which continually caused
translation problems.   The letter reads as follows:
Dear Mr. Minister:
On behalf of the United States government, I now
outline steps to resolve this issue.
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Both President Bush and Secretary of State Powell
have expressed their sincere regret over your
missing pilot and aircraft.  Please convey to the
Chinese people and to the family of pilot Wang
Wei that we are very sorry for their loss.
Although the full picture of what transpired is
still unclear, according to our information, our
severely crippled aircraft made an emergency
landing after following international emergency
procedures.  We are very sorry the entering of
China’s airspace and the landing did not have
verbal clearance, but very pleased the crew
landed safely.  We appreciate China’s efforts to
see to the well-being of our crew.
In view of the tragic incident and based on my
discussions with your representative, we have
agreed to the following actions:
Both sides agree to hold a meeting to discuss the
incident.  My government understands and expects
that our aircrew will be permitted to depart
China as soon as possible.
The meeting would start April 18, 2001.
The meeting agenda would include discussion of
the causes of the incident, possible
recommendations whereby such collisions could be
avoided in the future, development of a plan for
prompt return of the EP-3 aircraft, and other
related issues.  We acknowledge your government’s
intention to raise U.S. reconnaissance missions







The incident came to end once the letter from the
United States was agreed upon.  The decision on the wording
of the letter from President Bush was negotiated between
Ambassador Prueher and the Vice Foreign Minister of the MFA
Zhou Wenzhong, although MFA officials had to call Jiang or
possibly Qian Qichen before making any agreements.  Some
may argue that the game plan could not have been laid out
before Jiang left for South America on April 4 because a
decision to release the crew could not be made until the
Chinese conducted a rescue mission for their own pilot or
declared that he was dead. 
There was fear on the part of China's top leaders that
formal protests might be filed with the UN if the situation
escalated.   There was also pressure from business leaders
in China urging the PRC to end the dispute.  It has been
said that somewhere in Beijing, a top government official
shot up in bed after hearing, “Attention Kmart shoppers, do
not buy Chinese made sneakers, T-shirts, slacks, blouses,
sweaters or anything else.  Check the label and remember
the Americans being held on Hainan Island.  Have a nice
day.”45  China had much at stake in the standoff with the
United States, especially real investment and trade dollars
coming in to the country.  Continuing economic growth and
the requisite internal stability are Jiang’s highest
priority and have been since he has been in office.  The
EP-3 incident was very sensitive for China, but it was also
seen as an opportunity for China to make the U.S. Bush
Administration have a greater appreciation for the region.
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After the decision was made to return the crew to the
United States, a meeting between American and Chinese
leaders was set up for April 18 2001.  The agenda was
prepared by both sides, and both sides took into
consideration who their representatives would be.  The
first item on the agenda was to discuss how the collision
occurred.  The U.S. and Chinese versions of events are
still not very close, but both sides agreed to disagree. 
The second item for the agenda was the discussion of the
prompt return of the EP-3 aircraft.  A proposal was given
to Chinese MFA representatives, who said they would need to
discuss the proposal with their higher headquarters.  
The April 18 meeting was not a productive meeting with
any positive results, but it was symbolically significant
in that it was a beginning to diplomatic talks.  Both sides
were able to openly express their views on the incident. 
Additionally, it was an important step in the process, so
that further steps could take place following the meeting. 
The second decision--to return the aircraft--was a
very long and hostile process.  Discussions on when and how
to return the damaged EP-3 to the United States began on 1
May when American Embassy representatives and Lockheed
Martin officials went to Hainan to inspect the aircraft. 
This visit was ultimately a success after the PLA Navy
reluctantly allowed the U.S. officials to properly inspect
the aircraft.  The negotiations for the return of the plane
included meetings with the MFA and the Ministry of National
Defense (MND), as well as representatives from USCINCPAC,
USDAO Beijing, and U.S. Embassy Political section.  The
U.S. side was rebutted at each request to repair and fly
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the aircraft out of China.  Ultimately it was agreed that
the United States would disassemble the aircraft and fly it
out in a large cargo aircraft.   Finally, by May 25, the
U.S. Embassy wrote a letter with a list of requirements
that was presented to the MFA in Beijing.  The Chinese
eventually agreed to almost all of the requirements.
By looking at the EP-3 incident, a certain decision-
making pattern can be determined, or at least speculated. 
First, top leaders must save face by casting blame on the
other party.  Second, they must maximize room for maneuver
by putting the ball in the opponent’s court.  Third, they
let piecemeal unfold slowly without making concessions.  In
the EP-3 case, decision-making behavior reflected: 1)
leadership succession factors; 2) regime insecurity; or 3)
a distrust of the United States.  Hence the delay in
returning the crew and an even longer delay in returning
the aircraft.  The prolonged decision making process could
have also been a result of regime insecurity.  Jiang Zemin
had to please the PLA and party hard-liners, keep peace
with the citizenry, keep international involvement low-key,
and try to do the right thing without damaging the Sino-
U.S. relationship or the Chinese economy. 
As the EP-3 case shows, in China there is a lack of
institutionalized mechanisms for dealing with international
crises.  There is no crisis management structure per se. 
Jiang Zemin and his colleagues make decisions, but they
have to shape their responses in keeping with the interest
of the PLA and other institutions and with public opinion.  
In crisis situations, political and military leaders at the
highest levels engage in very close coordination, but
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exactly how this is translated into coordination at the
lower levels of China’s massive and complex bureaucracy
remains unanswerable.
According to U.S. Naval attaches in Beijing,
communications are a problem in Beijing when it comes to
solving problems in times of crisis.  For example, if U.S.
Embassy officials want to speak to anyone in the MFA or the
PLA, they have to go through the Ministry of National
Defense to coordinate a meeting or even a phone call. 
There is apparently no communication between U.S. DAO
officials in Beijing and their Chinese counterparts.  All
decisions and discussions happen at the top, prohibiting
lower-level officials from talking and sorting out details
among themselves.  At the highest levels in China, layers
of approval must be obtained and discretion is rarely
permitted.  The Chinese rarely change their positions on
the spot or come prepared with a clear range of positions
which they can set forth without reference or
consultation.46  
In response to demands by President Bush, the Chinese
leadership laid out demands that were both immediate (the
United States should accept responsibility) and symbolic
(the United States should apologize).  For China, the
principles of the agreement are just as important as the
specific issues.   Principle is important but flexible as
long as China can somehow rationalize that its fundamental
interests have not been compromised.   Typical Chinese
style is to begin negotiations with an impossible outcome,
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and then to act as if they are doing the other side a favor
by backing off.  The Chinese negotiating style is
eventually to come down to the originally defined outcome
as a gesture of goodwill, even though everyone knows it is
the practical thing to do.   For example, when a Chinese
admiral announced to the crew that they were being
released, he said to them, “You need to understand that
this is not a sign of weakness on our part, but a sign of
humanitarianism...”.47
According to Lucian Pye, the Chinese use principles,
patience, impenetrability of bureaucracies, and efforts to
impose a sense of guilt to narrow the framework of
negotiations.  Additionally, the Chinese use gestures of
friendship to lure counterparts to concessions they might
not otherwise make, while they make their positions known
first.48   On political issues, Chinese negotiators take on
many old patterns designed to put opponents on the
defensive, making them responsible for damage to the
relationship.  The Chinese have found that time pressures
also affect their negotiating style, such as the upcoming
Easter holiday in the United States, and the demand to have
the U.S. crew returned by Easter Sunday.  As it happened,
the crew returned only four days before Easter.  To many
Americans, eleven days of negotiations to return the crew
seemed like an eternity.  However, to the Chinese, 11 days
was actually expedient for decision-making.  They believe
that 11 days was long enough to think things through, but
not too long to damage Sino-U.S. relations.   Nevertheless,
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the Chinese have been ready to stall in negotiations when
there are conflicts among the leadership on how to deal
with the issue.  If the Chinese are put in a position where
they are anxious to conclude a deal, then they feel at a
disadvantage in the situation.  Thus, it is better for them
to string along the process at their own pace, even if they
are under pressures of time.  
According to Richard Solomon, the Chinese conduct
negotiations in a purposeful and meticulously planned
manner, even if are not in control of the process and have
to “feel their way” in situations they do not fully
understand.49  Generally, the Chinese enmesh foreign
negotiators in a process that they can manage to their own
advantage.  Politically, it would be devastating for the
party leader to put the country in a position of dependence
on a foreign power.  Thus, by setting high expectations
during the EP-3 negotiations, the PRC leadership felt that
they had the upper-hand, rather than being controlled or
manipulated by the United States.
PRC officials go to great lengths to draw out a
foreign counterpart regarding the government’s position on
issues under negotiation.  It is not until very late in the
negotiation process, when the adversary’s position has been
thoroughly tested, that high-level Chinese officials will
begin to moderate their initial demands.   Ultimately, the
Chinese enter into the negotiation process with a clear
sense of what they want as an end result, even if it seems
unattainable to their counterpart.
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One reason it is difficult for Americans to understand
the way in which Chinese make decisions or negotiate is
because the United States often follows a legalistic
approach, which the Chinese severely distrust.  The Chinese
base decisions on the senior political leadership or
bureaucratic interests.  Their position is justified in
terms of principle rather than legal requirements. 
Additionally, the political and bureaucratic structure in
the United States is decentralized and collegial, while the
PRC is centralized, hierarchical and disciplined.  These
characteristics affect the pace of decision-making and
continuity.50  
The EP-3 incident demonstrates how PRC decision-making
mechanisms (or a lack thereof), function in real-world
circumstances.   It is clear that the authority for making
decisions about sensitive political issues remains
concentrated in the hands of a very few top leaders, rather
than in an institutional framework of the kind that the
United States employs and is therefore most used to dealing
with.  Institutions do play a role in decision-making at
lower levels, but only with issues that are less sensitive
and with those that will have smaller repercussions if a
bad decision is made.  
To sum up the EP-3 negotiations, Ambassador Prueher
said, “Diplomacy in China consists of building ladders so
they can climb out of the holes they dig.”51
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B.  THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN CHINA
The question to address in this section is how PRC
officials use the media as a component of their approach to
negotiations.  Additionally, how do media bring pressure on
Chinese officials or on the United States?  The Chinese
have a reputation for manipulating media sources in China,
so that the general public will only receive one side of a
story and will therefore support the party line.  Chinese
media are required to serve as the “mouthpiece” of the CCP,
which stresses “uniformity in public opinion” and “speaking
along the same lines.”52  The propaganda system in China is
responsible to the Party Propaganda Department, and is a
fundamental system through which the results of major
decisions flow.
The Xinhua News Agency gathers information mostly from
public sources, whereas the PLA GSD’s Third Directorate
eavesdrops on both public and secret communications of
foreign countries.53  The Chinese media are of two types: 
open (for public use), and closed (internal access only). 
The closed media sources serve as information both to
inform leaders and the broader masses.   The regular
pattern in Chinese media, is to publish important
information for the internal press first, then provide the
party’s line on the issue in public media.  Thus, it can be
assumed that anything that was published about the EP-3
incident by the Xinhua News Agency was first viewed and
approved internally at the State Council level, and
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probably higher levels.  Surely, even more was reported
internally that was never released to the general public
because of sensitivity issues.
The media play two important roles relevant to the
foreign policy process in China.  The first is to
articulate and interpret Chinese policies for audiences at
home and abroad.  The second is to gather and disseminate
to China’s elite and masses information on world affairs.54
The People’s Daily plays an important role in
articulating official policy within China.   The editors of
People’s Daily clearly belong to the top party elite, and
therefore they are to a certain extent involved in the
formulation, as well as the implementation, of policy. 
Thus, anything published in the People’s Daily and released
to the public has been approved by party elites.
Regarding individual initiative in the press or in
public, individuals cannot bypass the establishment and
gain access to central leadership or to central
bureaucracies.  Public opinion does not have much direct
impact on policy-making, although the bombing of the
Chinese embassy in Belgrade provoked new tensions in Sino-
U.S. relations and unleashed a wave of nationalistic
emotion.  In this case, public opinion had a clear impact
on both the conduct of elite politics and on Chinese
foreign policy.   Public opinion seems destined to play a
more important and more difficult role in Chinese foreign
policy in the future. 
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Regarding Chinese public opinion during the EP-3
incident, there are some reports that most Chinese wanted
the incident to be over quickly so that tourism would
continue.55  However, all Chinese newspapers said the same
thing, and the Chinese public would repeat those
statements: the US plane had rammed the Chinese F-8. 
Nevertheless, it is likely that most educated people in
China realized that it was an accident and the government
was not acting prudently about the situation.  
At the same time, there were many Chinese who were
angry with American media because they were portraying the
Chinese pilot not as a victim but as a “hot-dog” and not
taking any responsibility for the accident.  In step with
the party line, very few people said the American crew
should be released.  Many said that they believed the
American crew could be used as a bargaining chip in
negotiations with Washington.  The Chinese press printed
official statements demanding that the United States
cooperate with China in an investigation and assume all
blame for the lost Chinese pilot.  Additionally, Chinese
internet chat rooms filled with anti-U.S. comments, and the
official China Daily accused the United States of arrogance
and irresponsible international behavior.  Apparently
afraid that such sentiment might spin out of control,
Chinese internet censors removed some of the more vitriolic
comments from chat rooms and electronic bulletin boards.
The world’s news media focused on the incident, and
scrutiny would only hurt the Chinese.  Beijing was eager to
be named host of the 2008 Olympic games and for admission
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to the WTO.  Thus, whatever the Chinese would do with the
24 crew members, it would be done under the eye of the
world media.
PRC media, directed by party officials, manipulated
the apology letter from the US Ambassador to Beijing.  The
American version contained different terms than the Chinese
version, and a separate Chinese summary was given to
reporters by the Chinese Foreign Ministry.  Also, in
reporting Secretary Powell’s comments, the New China News
Agency selectively quoted his remarks saying, “We’re sorry
that that happened,” without adding his next sentence: “But
that can’t be seen as an apology accepting
responsibility.”56
There were several factors that went in to the
decision-making process in China, including Chinese public
opinion, world opinion, and American public opinion.  In
the case of the EP-3, American public opinion most likely
was hurrying along the PRC decision, because the Easter
holiday was approaching.  If those 24 crewmembers were not
home by Easter, the Chinese knew that Americans would not
be happy.   Therefore, world news and international media
sources influenced the Communist Party just as their own
media influenced the Chinese people.  The media in China
have a similar effect on the public as does the media in
the United States.  The difference is the amount of control
placed on Chinese media, which shapes the thoughts of the
Chinese masses.
                    
56 “US, China Reach Standstill in Talks Over Plane Crew” in The Los





















V.   FUTURE TRENDS
A.  CHINA'S FOURTH GENERATION DECISION-MAKERS
The Sixteenth Party Congress is scheduled for 2002, at
which time there will be a turnover in CPC leadership.  The
position of the president, premier, and other posts
determined by the National People’s Congress will change
hands in 2003.  Members of the “fourth generation” of
Chinese leaders currently occupy several seats on the
Central Committee, the Politburo, and the State Council. 
Currently, Jiang Zemin is head of the Chinese
Communist Party's Leading Small Group on Foreign Affairs. 
Jiang and Vice Premier Qian Qichen apparently have
authority regarding foreign policy decision-making.  There
will be a change in leadership when Jiang relinquishes his
positions as Communist Party General Secretary in 2002 and
as president of the PRC in 2003.  Additionally, Qian, who
is now 72 years old, is expected to leave the Politburo in
2002.  Hu Jintao, 58, is expected to take over as president
of China and general secretary of the Communist Party.  Hu
is currently not a member of the Leading Small Group on
Foreign Affairs, and he lacks diplomatic experience. 
Perhaps this accounts for Jiang Zemin’s decision to leave
the EP-3 incident in the hands of Hu Jintao when he left
for Latin America, thereby allowing him to gain experience
in the initial stages of a diplomatic crisis, or at least
to make it appear that way to the Chinese public.
Jiang Zemin would probably like to remain as CMC
chairman even though he is expected to retire in 2002. 
Other top leaders scheduled to retire are Li Peng, Zhu
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Rongji, Li Lanqing, Wei Jianxing, Zhang Wannian, and Chi
Haotian.  If Jiang remains in a high echelon leadership
position, Li Peng will also want to remain in his position
as chairman of the National People’s Congress.  Li is
possibly interested in Presidency of the PRC, but this is
an unlikely step in the succession.  Zhu Rongji may also
stay on for an extra term, which would be legitimate since
he is a one-term premier and could be reelected.  This
remains a possibility since he is extremely popular within
the Party.  
Additionally, of the 17 remaining full and alternate
members of the Politburo, six will be forced to retire in
2002 because of the age restriction.  On the Central
Committee, 75 members will reach age seventy by 2002. 
Anywhere between 75 and 120 of the 188 members could retire
in 2002.   Also, nine heads of ministries or commissions
are slated to retire during the next round of elections. 
From all of these indications, it is evident that there
will be a large turnover in the government in the near
future.  “Fourth generation” technocrats are the up-and-
coming leaders, whether China is ready or not.
In 1982 at the 12th Party Congress, technocrats began
to emerge among the party elite when they were recruited
onto the Central Committee of the CCP.  They included Li
Peng, Hu Qili, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Wang Zhaoguo.  
Those “third generation” leaders are now going to be
replaced by the aspiring “fourth generation.”  Possible
Standing Committee promotions for next year could include
Wen Jiabao as Premier, Li Ruihuan as NPC chairman, Luo Gan
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as CDIC chairman, Wu Bangguo as economic czar, and Zeng
Qinghong as party apparatchik.57
Hu Jintao, China’s next president, began his political
career as a mishu in to the chair of the Gansu Construction
Committee in 1974-1975.  As many mishus do, Hu began to
make significant political connections and was soon
appointed as secretary of the national Chinese Communist
Youth League before moving on to be president of the
Communist Party School.  Hu is known to be associated with
Zhang Hong, Deng Xiaoping’s son-in-law, which may have
helped him obtain a seat on the Politburo Standing
Committee.58  Hu Jintao is in favor of military reform and
plans to carry out a three phase reform of the PLA, PLAN,
and PLAAF over the next nine years.59  Additionally, Hu is
in favor of educational reform and encourages young
scientists and technicians to integrate their own ideals
with the future of the nation.  The future president of
China is known as a moderate who leans toward being a
liberal reformer.  Many China analysts suggest that Hu will
lead China into an era of political reform.  
Wen Jiabao, who may become China’s next premier in
place of Zhu Rongji, is currently a member of the Politburo
and is the youngest vice premier on the State Council.  Wen
Jiabao’s recent work for the party has focused on domestic
issues.  He oversaw the restructuring of China’s banks and
the stabilization of the stock markets.  Wen has also made
                    
57 H. Lyman Miller, “The Road to the Sixteenth Party Congress” in
China Leadership Monitor, (No. 1, Dec 2001), 7. 
58 Cheng Li, China's Leaders; The New Generation, (New York: Rowman
and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001), 126n88.
59 Luo Hui, “PRC’s Hu Jintao, Japan’s Nonaka Discuss Bilateral
Relations” from Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese as
 70

several public speeches advocating the improvement of
China’s economic structure, advancing science and
technology, and opening China to the outside world.60  Like
Hu Jintao, Wen has been labeled as a liberal reformer.  
Li Ruihuan is expected to take over for Li Peng as NPC
chairman.  Although they each have the same surname, there
is no familial relation.  Li Ruihuan is currently a member
of the PBSC and is chairman of the CPPCC, and like most
“fourth generation” leaders, did not serve in the military. 
In 1989, Li was was assigned the responsibility for party
ideology by Deng Xiaoping.61  Li is well traveled and has
taken the initiative to broaden the role of the CPPCC
chairman, placing a much greater emphasis on foreign
affairs and international diplomacy.  He has published two
books: Ideas on Urban Development and Ideas on Doing
Practical Things for People.  Li Ruihuan has served the
party well, and will continue to contribute good ideas to
the country and the party as he carries the belief that the
government must do something “concrete for the people.”  
Luo Gan is a member of the Politburo, member
secretariat of the Central Commiteee, and a State
Councilor.  He has been associated with Li Peng, who is
considered quite conservative by “fourth generation”
technocrats.   It is likely that Luo will take over as
China’s Discipline Inspection Committee chairman (CDIC). 
Although he is neither a moderate or liberal reformer like
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other up and coming leaders, it may serve the party well to
have a more conservative man as chairman of the discipline
committee.  
Wu Bangguo, currently a vice premier of the State
Council and member of the Politburo, is expected to become
China’s next economic czar.  Wu Bangguo worked as a close
aid to Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji from 1985-1991, and so he
is aware of Jiang’s vision for China’s economy.  Wu
advocates the reform of China’s state owned enterprises
(SOEs), which still absorb approximately 75% of China’s
capital.  Wu also has been working on a social security
system for China, and he could be a great asset to China in
the coming years, especially given the huge economic impact
the 2008 Olympics will have on the PRC.  
Finally, Zeng Qinghong is presumed to be among “fourth
generation” leaders who will be promoted.  He is now only
an alternate member of the Politburo, but may soon be on
the PBSC.  Zeng is a technocrat who follows the party line
very closely.  He is an advocate of gender equality
throughout China and has encouraged the recruitment of 
female party members.  Zeng has also attempted to increase
the legitimacy of communism by promoting highly educated
party members.  Zeng seeks to change the party image by
encouraging young, well-educated men and women to join the
ranks of government.  
The only woman from the fourth generation leadership
who heads a ministry under the State Council is Chen Zhili. 
She is the minister of the PRC Ministry of Education and is
a close friend of Jiang Zemin.  She is also a full member
of the Central Committee.  Chen is expected to be one of
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the leading candidates for the Politburo in the next Party
Congress.  In the history of the CCP, only six women have
ever entered the Politburo, among them the wives of  Mao,
Lin Biao, and Zhou Enlai.  Discrimination against women
seems to continue into the twenty-first century in China,
but this trend may improve with new leaders such as Zeng
Qinghong and Chen Zhili.
China's future decision makers are expected to adopt
increasingly pragmatic approaches to socioeconomic problems
and their political implications than past PRC leaders.  In
fact, problems such as rural poverty, income disparity,
environmental degradation, social grievances, and high
unemployment rates are frequently and fervently discussed
by public intellectuals and the general public.   
Domestically, technocratic leaders tend to see scientific
and technological developments as determinant of
socioeconomic changes in a given society.  In the future,
many young economists may become more actively involved in
the policy-making process.   The new leaders will probably
accelerate China’s political reform and modify the pace and
emphasis of economic reforms.  Leaders at all levels of the
system may become more like technical managers and less
like strategic visionaries in the future.
Because of the disillusionment they experienced during
their formative years, “fourth generation” leaders are, in
general, ideologically less dogmatic, intellectually more
sophisticated, and practically more open-minded than their
predecessors.  They are also more accessible and more open
about their views and policies than their predecessors
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were.62   They will also be more comfortable in dealing with
the media, both domestic and foreign.  The number of
“fourth generation” of leaders in the military is
remarkably low.  This seems to be consistent with Jiang’s
political tactic of preventing the formation of any
potentially powerful military faction.  
On the other hand, many contend that this new
generation of Chinese leaders lacks a fundamental consensus
on major socioeconomic policies and overall political
solidarity.  Many of these new leaders have spent varying
lengths of time in the party and come from differing
backgrounds.  This generation is known for its obsession
with political networking, but also for its capability to
deal with challenges that the country faces and being
accountable to the Chinese people for their decisions.  In
order for the new generation of leaders to establish
legitimacy, they must transfer their own personal
preferences into collective decisions.  This is a trend
that we can expect to see in China in the coming years.
As far as a turnover in military leadership, Zhang and
Chi are set to retire at the Sixteenth Party Congress in
2002.  Leading candidates to replace them include General
Fu Quanyou, currently PLA chief of the General Staff
Department, and General Cao Gungchuan, head of the PLA
General Equipment Department.  General Cao is regarded as a
rising star in the military hierarchy.  He has recently
been put in charge of managing the PLA's weapons and
equipment apparatus, including research, development, and
procurement, which had previously been the responsibility
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and Littlefield Publishers, 2001), 206.
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of Zhang Wannian.  Additionally, Lieutenant Generals Guo
Boxiong and Xu Caihou were appointed to the CMC in 1999 in
preparation for their elevation to the CMC's top posts.  
The fourth generation leadership will be full of
technocrats and lawyers.  While engineers and economists
tend to rely more on their own expertise in policy-making,
lawyers may be more concerned about the procedures of
decision-making and the socio-political consequences of
policies.  This generation of leaders is likely to be even
more cynical about communist ideology than their
predecessors.
One thing is for certain.  China is changing, and this
is the decade in which Americans may watch the PRC undergo
major political, legal, educational, and military reform. 
Whether or not the communist system will prevail is
unknown, but the desire to improve society and the existing
situation in China is apparent among the new “fourth
generation” leaders.  The need for more institutionalized
and rational leadership selection procedures and better
mechanisms of supervision and responibility are being
recognized now, which has not been the case in the past.  
All China watchers will have a great deal to look forward








A.  ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN CHINA
Officially, the PBSC makes decisions on the basis of
consensus, but it is really up to the paramount leader to
make the final call, especially in times of crisis. 
Decisions are seldom put to an actual vote, although each
member's opinion is made known by way of statements made
during the meetings.  However, when the most authoritative
person makes his opinion known, the rest of the members
tend to concur.  Junior members generally refrain from
voicing a different opinion once the most authoritative
person  has stated his opinion.
The bottom line in PRC decision-making is that no
faction, no institution, no region, and no individual can
really dominate.  As to the actual process of decision-
making, the paramount leader has become less paramount and
has been forced to consult more broadly.  There is more
equality among members of the decision-making bodies.  The
policy-making process has therefore become less personal
and more compatible with foreign political systems,
although crisis matters are still highly personalized.63 
Nevertheless, as China has moved toward more active
participation in the international community and has
adopted increasingly pragmatic approaches to foreign
affairs, the overall trend has been toward the creation of
a better-organized and more effective foreign relations
apparatus.
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There is no real crisis management mechanism in China. 
China needs to establish a national security council in
order to be able to accomplish quick, rational responses. 
The “leading group” style approach for leadership is not
working for China.   Currently the PRC has established a
state security leading group, which is taking over the role
of the FALSG.64  Foreign cooperative relationships are
essential to both China’s international security and
domestic development and could be a means to strengthen the
country.  
According to Beijing, China’s virtue in international
affairs consists in the fact that its foreign policy is
based not on expediency but on immutable principles that
express universal values such as justice and equity.  
Nevertheless, we can expect that Chinese foreign policy
behavior will continue to be sufficiently ambiguous,
complex, shifting, and multiprincipled and should offer
aspiring theorists a sure challenge.65
China needs to establish a crisis management
mechanism, which coincidentally would be more advantageous
in a multilateral format than in a bilateral form.  A
multilateral format will prevent one side from cutting off
communications, which would keep the lines of communication
open during a crisis and increase support for China’s
foreign policy initiatives.  
China's future leaders are most likely to choose
policies that increasingly conform to widely accepted
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international norms and practices.66  There has been a major
trend in China which involves the gradual decentralization
of power, particularly in implementing policies.  
There is no single Western theoretical framework that
can capture the entirety of foreign policy decision-making
in China.  The “fourth generation” of leaders will likely
continue a cooperative foreign policy.  Because of their
varying backgrounds, they are likely to be more flexible
and more capable of finding middle ground between techno-
nationalism and techno-globalism.  Techno-globalism
emphasizes technology as an international endeavor and a
product of multinational institutions, whereas techno-
nationalism focuses on technology endeavors at the national
level.67  Beijing has declared that domestic economic growth
is its overriding objective.
In the case of the EP-3 incident, China managed to
extract maximum pay-off from the United States with minimum
support.  In the end, through its fence-straddling
strategy, China managed to make Washington into an anxious
supplicant awaiting Beijing’s final decision.  This time it
worked for China, only because the eleven-day stand-off did
not over extend the patience of the White House.  However,
in the future, we can expect decisions to be made more
speedily and more decisively.  Additionally, we can expect
more open communications between top heads of state and
more consensus between civilian and military leadership,
with the PLA taking on a smaller role.  China does not need
                    
66 David M. Lampton, ed., The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security
Policy; in the Era of Reform, (CA: Stanford University Press, 2001),
13.
67 Cheng Li, China's Leaders; The New Generation, (New York: Rowman
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to be threatened by the U.S. military in order to act
accordingly.  It simply requires the appropriate amount of
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